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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of how to design large decentralized
multi-agent systems (MAS’s) in an automated fashion, with
little or no hand-tuning. Our approach has each agent run
a reinforcement learning algorithm. This converts the prob-
lem into one of how to automatically set/update the reward
functions for each of the agents so that the global goal is
achieved. In particular we do not want the agents to “work
at cross-purposes” as far as the global goal is concerned. We
use the term artificial COllective INtelligence (COIN) to re-
fer to systems that embody solutions to this problem. In this
paper we present a summary of a mathematical framework
for COINs. We then investigate the real-world applicability
of the core concepts of that framework via two computer ex-
periments: we show that our COINs perform near optimally
in a difficult variant of Arthur’s bar problem [1] (and in par-
ticular avoid the tragedy of the commons for that problem),
and we also illustrate optimal performance for our COINs in
the leader-follower problem.
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we are interested in computational problems
having the following characteristics:
• the agents each run reinforcement learning (RL) algo-
rithms;
• there is little to no centralized communication or control;
• there is a provided world utility function that rates the
possible histories of the full system.
There are many examples of such problems, some of the
more prominent being:
1. Designing a control system for constellations of com-
munication satellites or of constellations of planetary
exploration vehicles (world utility in the latter case
being some measure of quality of scientific data col-
lected);
2. Designing a control system for routing over a commu-
nication network (world utility being some aggregate
quality of service measure);
3. Construction of parallel algorithms for solving numer-
ical optimization problems (the optimization problem
itself constituting the world utility);
4. Control of a large, distributed chemical plant.
These kinds of problems may well be most readily ad-
dressed by using a large Multi-Agent System (MAS) [19],
where each agent is restricted to communicate with only a
few neighbors, and where each agent runs a Reinforcement
Learning (RL) algorithm. In such systems, a crucial problem
is ensuring that the agents’ RL algorithms do not “work at
cross-purposes”, so that their collective behavior maximizes
a provided global utility function. The difficulty in achiev-
ing this is that these systems have no centralized control, so
the dynamics is governed by the collective effects of the indi-
vidual agents each modifying their behavior via their (local)
RL algorithms.
We are interested in such systems where the agents are
“greedy” (i.e., there is no external structure forcing cooper-
ation). However, both the agents reward functions and the
overall system structure are automatically set and then up-
dated in a machine learning-like fashion, so as to facilitate
the achievement of the global objective.
As opposed to hand-tailored MAS design, these alter-
native approaches potentially have the following benefits:
one does not have to laboriously model the entire system;
global performance is “robust”; one can scale up to very
large systems; and one can maximally exploit the power of
machine learning. We use the term COllective INtelligence
(COIN) [21, 22, 23] to refer to either MAS’s designed in this
way, or (in the case of naturally occurring MAS’s) to MAS’s
investigated from this perspective.
The COIN framework is related to many other fields.
(See [21] for a detailed discussion of these relations, involv-
ing several hundred references.) Some of them are:
• multi-agent systems;
• computational economics;
• reinforcement learning for adaptive control;
• statistical mechanics;
• computational ecologies;
• game theory , in particular, evolutionary game theory.
Previous MAS’s most similar to a COIN include those where
agents use reinforcement learning [8, 13], and/or where
agents actively attempt to model the behavior of other
agents [14].
In this paper we introduce some of the concepts from
the COIN framework, and then present experiments test-
ing those concepts. The restricted version of the framework
presented here is not sufficient to formally guarantee opti-
mal global performance for all multi-agent systems. Rather
the experiments recounted below are designed to empirically
investigate the usefulness of these concepts in some illustra-
tive domains. In Section 2 we present general background
on COINs and the experiments we conducted. In Section 3,
we present the portion of the COIN framework investigated
in this paper. In Sections 4 and 5, we describe the bar and
leader-follower experiments, respectively, and how our ap-
proach deals with the many pitfalls encountered in each.
2 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
A naturally occurring example of a system that can be
viewed as COIN is a human economy. For example, one
can take the agents to be the individuals trying to maximize
their personal rewards. One might then declare that the
world utility is a time average of the gross domestic prod-
uct. (“World utility” per se is not a construction internal
to a human economy, but rather something defined from
the outside.) To achieve high global utility it is necessary to
avoid having the agents work at cross-purposes lest phenom-
ena like the Tragedy of the Commons (TOC) occur, in which
individual avarice works to lower global utility [12]. One way
to avoid such phenomena is by modifying the agents’ util-
ity functions via punitive legislation. A real world example
of an attempt to make such a modification was the cration
of anti-trust regulations designed to prevent monopolistic
practices.
In designing a COIN we have more freedom than anti-
trust regulators though, in that there is no base-line “or-
ganic” local utility function over which we must superimpose
legislation-like incentives. Rather, the entire “psychology”
of the individual agents is at our disposal when designing a
COIN. This freedom is a major strength of the COIN ap-
proach, in that it obviates the need for honesty-elicitation
mechanisms, like auctions, which form a central component
of conventional economics.
We recently investigated the use of the COIN approach
for distributed control of network packet routing [22]. Con-
ventional approaches to packet routing have each router run
a shortest path algorithm (SPA), i.e., each router routes its
packets in the way that it expects will get those packets to
their destinations most quickly. Unlike with a COIN, with
SPA-based routing the routers have no concern for the pos-
sible deleterious side-effects of their routing decisions on the
global goal (e.g., they have no concern for whether they in-
duce bottlenecks). We ran simulations that demonstrated
that a COIN-based routing system has better throughputs
than does an SPA-based system [22].
In this paper we present a more fine-grained investiga-
tion of our COIN methodology, in which we disentangle two
of the major components of that methodology and exam-
ine the real-world usefulness of them separately. In the first
set of experiments we investigate how one might initialize
a COIN (i.e., initialize each agents’ local reward function)
to ensure that the agents do not work at cross purposes.
The problem we chose for this purpose is a more challenging
variant of Arthur’s bar attendance problem [1, 7, 17]. In
this problem, agents have to determine which night in the
week to attend a bar. The problem is set up so that if either
too few people attend (boring evening) or too many people
attend (crowded evening), the total enjoyment of the atten-
dees drops. Our goal is to design the reward functions of
the attendees so that the total enjoyment across all nights
is maximized. (This problem is similar to a number of prob-
lems arising in electronic commerce, where agents need to
select the “best” markets to trade their wares.)
In the second set of experiments we investigate how run-
time modification of agent utility functions and/or inter-
agent interactions can improve performance beyond that of
the initialized COIN. For this set of experiments we chose a
problem where certain “follower” agents mimic the activities
of other “leader” agents. The idea is to investigate a scenario
where actions that are beneficial to a particular agent have
deleterious global effects when copied by other agents.
3 COIN FRAMEWORK
As applied here, the COIN framework has three main com-
ponents:
1. The first component investigates various formaliza-
tions of the desideratum that whenever the local utility
functions increase, then so must the value of the world
utility. It implicitly defines equivalence classes of lo-
cal utility functions that meet those formalizations, for
allowed agent interactions of various types.
2. There is little explicit concern for the dynamical nature
of the COIN in this first component of the framework;
that dynamics is subsumed under the assumption that
the agents can achieve large values of their local utility
functions, via their RL learning. However due to that
dynamics it may be that the agents are all inadver-
tently “frustrating” each other, so that none of them
can achieve large values of their local utility functions.
The second component of the COIN framework ad-
dresses this problem by means of further restrictions
(beyond those of the first component) on the allowed
set of local utility functions. We call the design of a
system’s local utility functions using the two compo-
nents of the COIN framework the COIN initialization
of that system.
3. Successful COIN initialization ensures that if the
agents in the system achieve large values of their local
utility functions, then the world utility is also large.
However due to uncertainties in the type of the agent
interactions, in the real world the local utility func-
tions set in the COIN initialization are usually only a
good first guess. The third component of the COIN
framework addresses this issue by modifying the local
utility functions at run-time based on localized sta-
tistical information. We call this modifying process
macrolearning. In contrast, we call the reinforcement
learning that agents perform to optimize their local
reward microlearning.
In this paper we consider the state of the system across
a set of discrete, consecutive time steps, t ∈ {0, 1, ...}. With-
out loss of generality, we let all relevant characteristics of an
agent at time t — including its internal parameters at that
time as well as its externally visible actions — be encapsu-
lated by a Euclidean vector ζ
η,t
. We call this the “state” of
agent η at time t, and let ζ be the state of all agents across
all time. World utility, G(ζ), is a function of the state of
all agents across all time. Our goal as COIN designers is to
maximize world utility.
The following concepts and definitions form the core of
the COIN framework:
Subworlds: Subworlds are the sets making up an exhaus-
tive partition of all agents. For each subworld, ω, all agents
in that subworld have the same subworld utility function
gω(ζ) as their local utility functions. Accordingly, consider
having each subworld be a set of agents that collectively have
the most effect on each other. In this situation, by and large,
agents cannot work at cross-purposes, since all agents that
affect each other substantially share the same local utility.
Constraint-alignment: Associated with subworlds is the
concept of a (perfectly) constraint-aligned system. That is a
system in which any change to the state of the agents in sub-
world ω at time 0 will have no effect on the states of agents
outside of ω at times later than 0. Intuitively, a system
is constraint-aligned if no two agents in separate subworlds
affect each other, so that the rationale behind the use of
subworlds holds. (In the real world of course, systems are
rarely exactly constraint-aligned.)
Subworld-factored: A subworld-factored system is one
where for each subworld ω considered by itself, a change
at time 0 to the states of the agents in that subworld results
in an increased value for gω(ζ) if and only if it results in an
increased value for G(ζ). For a subworld-factored system,
the side effects on the rest of the system of ω’s increasing its
own utility do not end up decreasing world utility. For these
systems, the separate agents successfully pursuing their sep-
arate goals do not frustrate each other as far as world utility
is concerned.
The definition of subworld-factored is carefully crafted.
In particular, it does not concern changes in the value of the
utility of subworlds other than the one changing its state.
It also does not concern changes to the states of agents in
more than one subworld at once. Indeed consider the fol-
lowing property: any change at time 0 to the entire system
that improves all subworld utilities simultaneously also im-
proves world utility. This might seem an appealing alter-
native desideratum to subworld-factoredness. However one
can construct examples of systems that obey this property
and yet quickly evolve to a minimum of world utility (for
example this is the case in the TOC).
It can be proven that for a subworld-factored system,
when each of the agents’ reinforcement learning algorithms
are performing as well as they can, given each others’ be-
havior, world utility is at a critical point. Correct global
behavior corresponds to learners reaching a Nash equilib-
rium [21]. There can be no tragedy of the commons for a
subworld-factored system.
Wonderful life utility: Let CLω(ζ) be defined as the vec-
tor ζ modified by clamping the states of all agents in sub-
world ω, across all time, to an arbitrary fixed value, here
taken to be 0. The wonderful life subworld utility (WL) is:
gω(ζ) ≡ G(ζ)−G(CLω(ζ)) . (1)
When the system is constraint-aligned, so that, loosely
speaking, subworld ω’s “absence” would not affect the rest of
the system, we can view the WL utility as analogous to the
change in world utility that would have arisen if subworld
ω “had never existed”. (Hence the name of this utility -
cf. the Frank Capra movie.) Note however, that CL is a
purely mathematical operation. Indeed, no assumption is
even being made that CLω(ζ) is consistent with the dynam-
ics of the system. The succession of states the agents in ω
are clamped to in the definition of the WL utility need not
obey the dynamical laws of the system.
This dynamics-independence is a crucial strength of the
WL utility. It means that to evaluate the WL utility we do
not try to infer how the system would have evolved if all
agents in ω were set to 0 at time 0 and the system evolved
from there. So long as we know ζ extending over all time,
and so long as we know G, we know the value of WL utility.
This is true even if we know nothing of the dynamics of the
system.
Another crucial advantage of the WL utility arises from
the fact that in a COIN, each agent, by itself, is operating
in a large system of other agents, and therefore may expe-
rience difficulty discerning the effects of its actions on its
utility. Very often this problem is obviated by using the WL
utility; the subtraction of the clamped term in the WL util-
ity removes some of the “noise” of the activity of agents in
other subworlds, leaving only the underlying “signal” of how
the agents in the subworld at hand affect the utility. This
makes it easier for the microlearning to improve the utility
of the agents in that subworld. When the system is subworld
factored, this property facilitates the improvement of world
utility. In many circumstances, this cancelling characteris-
tic of WL also ensures that the utility functions obey the
applicable a priori locality restrictions on communications
among agents.
The experiments in this paper revolve around the follow-
ing fact: a constraint-aligned system with wonderful life sub-
world utilities is subworld-factored. Combining this with our
previous result that subworld-factored systems are at equi-
librium at critical points of world utility, this result leads us
to expect that a constraint-aligned system using WL utili-
ties in the microlearning will approach near-optimal values
of the world utility.
No such assurances accrue to WL utilities if the system is
not constraint-aligned however. Accordingly our first set of
experiments investigates how well a particular system per-
forms when WL utilities are used but little attention is paid
to ensuring that the system is constraint-aligned. Our sec-
ond set of experiments then focus on a macrolearning algo-
rithm that modifies subworld memberships dynamically, so
as to increase the degree of constraint-alignment, all while
using WL local utility functions.
4 BAR PROBLEM
4.1 EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
We conducted two sets of experiments to investigate the
COIN framework. The first set is a variant of Brian Arthur’s
bar-attendance model [1]. Since we are not interested here
in directly comparing our results to those in [1, 13], we use a
more conventional (and arguably “dumber”) reinforcement
learning algorithm than the ones investigated in [1, 13].
There are N agents, each of whom picks one of seven
nights to attend a bar the following week, a process that
is then repeated. In each week, each agent uses its own
reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm to decide which night
to attend to maximize its utility.
The world utility is of the form:
G(ζ) =
∑
t
7∑
k=1
γk(xk(ζ, t))
where “xj(ζ, t)” means the j’th component of x(ζ, t)
which is the attendance on night j at week t;
γk(y) ≡ αky exp (−y/c); c and each of the {αk} are real-
valued parameters. Intuitively, this world utility is the sum
of the world “rewards” for each night in each week.
This G is chosen to reflect the effects in the bar as the
attendance profile of agents changes. In the case when there
are too few agents, the bar suffers from lack of activity and
therefore the world utility should be low. Conversely, when
there are too many agents the bar becomes overcrowded and
the rewards should also be low. Note that γk(·) reaches its
maximum when its argument equals c.
The α’s are used to weight the importance of differ-
ent nights. Two different choices of the {αk} are investi-
gated. One treated attendance on all of the nights equally,
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Figure 1: Average performance when α = [0 0 0 7 0 0 0] (left) and when α = [1 1 1 1 1 1 1] (right). In both the top curve
is WL, middle is GR, and bottom is UD.
α = [1 1 1 1 1 1 1]. The other is only concerned with the
attendance on one night of the week, α = [0 0 0 7 0 0 0]. In
our experiments, c was 6 and N is chosen to be significantly
larger (4 times) than the number of agents necessary to have
c agents attend the bar on each of the seven nights, resulting
in 168 agents.
As explicated below, our microlearning algorithms
worked by providing a real-valued “reward” signal to each
agent at each week t. Each agent’s reward function is a sur-
rogate for an associated utility function for that agent. The
difference between the two functions is that the reward func-
tion only reflects the state of the system at one moment in
time (and therefore is potentially observable), whereas the
utility function reflects the agent’s ultimate goal, and there-
fore can depend on the full history of that agent across time.
We investigated the following functions specifying the re-
wards at time t for each of the agents:
• Uniform Division Reward:
UD(dω(t), ζ, t) ≡ γdω (xdω (ζ, t))/xdω (ζ, t)
• Global Reward:
GR(dω(t), ζ, t) ≡
7∑
k=1
γk(xk(ζ, t))
• Wonderful Life Reward:
WL( dω(t), ζ, t) ≡
7∑
k=1
γk(xk(ζ, t))−
7∑
k=1
γk(xk(CLω(ζ), t)) =
γdω (xdω (ζ, t))− γdω (xdω (CLω(ζ), t))
where dω is the night selected by subworld ω. Note the dis-
tinction between utilities and rewards. For example, world
utility is the sum over all time of global reward.
The UD reward is considered a natural “naive” choice
of an agent’s reward function; the total reward on each
night gets uniformly divided among the agents attending
that night.
Providing the GR reward at time t to each agent is con-
sidered a reasonable way to provide that agent an approx-
imation to the value of world utility that would ensue if
the current policies of all the agents were henceforth frozen
to their current polices. This reward function results in all
agents receiving the same feedback information. For this re-
ward, the system is automatically subworld-factored. How-
ever, evaluation of this function requires centralized commu-
nication.
Similarly, theWL reward at time t is considered a reason-
able approximation to the WL utility. However, in contrast
to the GR reward, to evaluate its WL reward each agent only
needs to know the total attendance on the night it attended.
In addition, as indicated above, one would expect that with
the WL reward the microlearners can readily discern the
effects of their rewards on their utilities — something not
necessarily true if they use the GR reward.
Each agent is its own subworld. Each agent’s microlearn-
ing algorithm uses a seven dimensional Euclidean vector to
represent the expected reward for each night of the week.
At the end of each week, the component of this vector cor-
responding to the night attended is proportionally adjusted
towards the actual subworld reward just received. At the
beginning of each week, the agent picks the night to attend
using a Boltzmann distribution with energies given by the
components of the vector of expected rewards. A decaying
temperature is used to aid exploration in the early stage of
the process. The microlearning algorithms are set to use
the same parameters (i.e. learning rate, Boltzmann tem-
perature, decay rates) for all three reward functions. This
learning algorithm is equivalent to Claus and Boutilier’s [8]
independent learner algorithm for multi-agent reinforcement
learning.
4.2 RESULTS
Figure 1 presents world reward values as a function of time
for the bar problem, averaged over 50 separate runs. Note
that world utility is the sum over time of world reward. We
present the performance for all three subworld reward func-
tions for both α = [1 1 1 1 1 1 1] and α = [0 0 0 7 0 0 0].
Systems using the WL reward converged to optimal per-
formance. This indicates that the bar problem is sufficiently
constraint-aligned so that interactions between subworlds
does not diminish performance. Presumably this is true
because the only interactions between subworlds occurred
indirectly, via the microlearning.
Moreover, since the WL reward is easier for the mi-
crolearners to exploit (see above), one would expect the con-
vergence using the WL reward to be far quicker than that
using the GR reward. The GR reward does eventually con-
verge to the global optimum. This is in agreement with the
results obtained by Crites [9] for the bank of elevators control
problem. However, when α = [0 0 0 7 0 0 0] the GR reward
converged in 1250 weeks. This is more than 4 times the con-
vergence time for the WL reward. When α = [1 1 1 1 1 1 1]
the GR reward took 6500 weeks to converge, which was more
than 30 times the time WL reward took to converge. This
slow convergence is a result of the reward signal being di-
luted by the large number of agents in the system.
In contrast to the behavior for reward functions based
on the COIN framework, use of the UD subworld reward
function results in very poor world reward values that dete-
riorated as the microlearning progressed. For the case where
world reward only depends on a single night, this is essen-
tially an instance of the tragedy of the commons; it is in
every agent’s interest to attend the same night, and their
doing this shrinks the world reward “pie” that must be di-
vided among all agents.
Taken together, these experiments demonstrate that the
initialization prescriptions of the COIN framework can result
in excellent global performance.
5 LEADER-FOLLOWER PROBLEM
5.1 EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
In the experiments recounted in the previous section the sys-
tem was sufficiently constraint-aligned for the WL reward
to result in optimal performance. The second set of ex-
periments involving leaders and followers also used WL re-
ward. These experiments investigated the use of macrolearn-
ing to make an initially non-aligned system more constraint-
aligned, and thereby improve the world utility. In this ex-
periment, macrolearning consists of changing the subworld
memberships of the agents.
In these experiments the bar problem is modified to in-
corporate constraints designed to frustrate WL subworld re-
ward. This is done by forcing the nights picked by some
agents (followers) to agree with those picked by other agents
(leaders). Each leader has two followers. The world utility is
the sum, over all leaders, of the values of a triply-indexed re-
ward matrix whose indices are the the nights that the leader
and his two followers attend:
G(ζ) =
∑
t
∑
i
Rli(t),f1i(t),f2i(t)
where li(t) is the night the i
th leader attends, and f1i(t)
and f2i(t) are the nights attended by the followers of leader
i, in week t. The system’s dynamics is what restricts all
the members of each triple (li(t), f1i(t), f2i(t)) to equal the
night picked by leader i for week t. However, G and R are
defined for all possible triples, li(t), f1i(t) and f2i(t).
So in particular, R is defined for dynamically unrealiz-
able triples that arise in the clamping operation. Because
of this, for certain R’s there exists subworld memberships
such that the dynamics assures poor world utility when WL
rewards are used. This is precisely the type of problem that
macrolearning is designed to correct.
To investigate the efficacy of the macrolearning, two sets
of separate experiments were conducted. In the first one the
reward matrix R is chosen so that when leader and follower
agents are placed in separate subworlds, leaders maximiz-
ing their WL reward results in minimal world reward. In
contrast to the bar problem experiments, in these experi-
ments, due to the coupling between leaders and followers,
having each agent be its own subworld would mean badly
violating constraint-alignment. (The idea is that by chang-
ing subworld memberships macrolearning can correct this
and thereby induce constraint-alignment.) In the second set
of experiments, rather than hand-crafting the worst-case re-
ward matrix, we investigate the efficacy of macrolearning for
a broader spectrum of reward matrices generated randomly.
For the worst-case reward matrix, the subworld mem-
bership that results in the most constraint-aligned system is
when a leader and associated followers belong to the same
subworld. The least constraint-alignment occurs when the
leader and associated followers are all in separate subworlds.
In addition to these two cases we also investigate random
subworld membership. We investigate all these cases both
with and without macrolearning, and with both worst case
and a full spectrum of random reward matrices. The mi-
crolearning in these experiments is the same as in the bar
problem. All leader-follower experiments use the WL sub-
world reward.
When macrolearning is used, it is implemented after the
microlearning has run for a specified number of weeks. The
macrolearning works by estimating the correlations between
the nights picked by the agents. This is done by examining
the attendances of the agents over the preceding weeks. The
agents estimated to be the most correlated with one another
are grouped into the same subworld, with the restriction that
the number of agents per subworld is always three.
5.2 RESULTS
Figure 2 presents performance averaged over 50 runs for
world reward as a function of weeks using the worst case re-
ward matrix. For comparison purposes, the top curve repre-
sents the case where the leaders and their followers are placed
in the same subworld so that there is perfect constraint-
alignment. The bottom curve represents the other extreme
where the leaders and their followers are placed in differ-
ent subworlds resulting in minimal constraint-alignment. In
both plots, the middle curve shows the performance of ran-
domly initialized subworlds with (right) and without (left)
macrolearning.
The performance for randomly assigned subworlds dif-
fers only slightly from that of having each agent be its own
subworld; both start with poor values of world reward that
deteriorates with time. However, when macrolearning is
performed on systems with initially random subworld as-
signments, the system quickly rectifies itself and converges
to optimal performance. This is reflected by the sudden
vertical jump through the middle of the right plot at 500
weeks, the point at which macrolearning changes the sub-
world memberships. This demonstrates that by changing
the subworld memberships macrolearning results in perfect
constraint-alignment, so that the WL subworld reward func-
tion quickly induces the maximal value of the world reward.
Figure 3 presents performance averaged over 50 runs for
world reward as a function of weeks using a spectrum of re-
ward matrices selected at random. The ordering of the plots
is exactly as in Figure 2. Macrolearning is applied at 2000
weeks, in the right plot. The simulations in Figure 3 were
lengthened from those in Figure 2 because the convergence
time are longer.
The macrolearning algorithm results in a transient degra-
dation in performance at 2000 weeks followed by convergence
to the optimal. Without macrolearning the system’s perfor-
mance no longer varies after 2000 weeks. Combined with
the results presented in Figure 2, these experiments demon-
strate that the COIN construction of macrolearning works
quite well.
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Figure 2: Leader-follower problem with worst case reward matrix. In both plots the top curve represents perfect constraint-
alignment, the bottom curve represents minimal constraint-alignment, and the middle curves represent random subworlds
without (left) and with (right) macrolearning at 500 weeks.
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Figure 3: Leader-follower problem for full spectrum reward matrices. The ordering of the plots is exactly as in Figure 3.
Macrolearning is applied at 2000 weeks, in the right plot.
6 CONCLUSION
For MAS’s to fulfill their full potential, even when used in
large systems having strong limitations on inter-agent inter-
actions and communication, a way is needed to automati-
cally configure/update the system to achieve the provided
global goal. One approach to this problem is to have each
agent run a reinforcement learning algorithm and then con-
figure/update the associated reward functions (and other
characteristics) of the agents so as to facilitate achievement
of the global goal. This is the central concept embodied in
COINs.
In this paper we presented a summary of (a portion of)
the mathematical framework of COINs. We then presented
two sets of experiments empirically validating the predic-
tions of that framework. The first set of experiments con-
sidered difficult variants of Arthur’s famous El Farol Bar
problem. These experiments showed that even when the
conditions required by the theorems of how to initialize a
COIN do not hold exactly, they often hold well enough so
that they can be applied with confidence. In those exper-
iments, the COINs quickly achieved optimal performance
despite the local nature of the information available to each
agent, and in particular the COINs automatically avoided
the tragedy of the commons that was designed into those
experiments. This was not true when the reward functions
were either set in a “naive” manner or were all set to equal
the global reward.
The second set of experiments considered leader-follower
problems that were hand-designed to cause maximal diffi-
culty for those COIN initialization theorems. These experi-
ments explicitly tested the run-time updating procedures of
the COIN framework for overcoming such initialization prob-
lems. Here, as expected, the initial performance of the COIN
was quite poor. However once the updating procedures were
brought online, performance quickly rose to optimal. Again,
this was in contrast to the case where the reward functions
were either set in a “naive” manner or were all set to equal
the global reward.
The conclusion of these experiments is that the prescrip-
tions of the COIN framework for how to configure a large
MAS often apply even when the exact conditions required
by the associated theorems do not hold. Moreover, in those
relatively unusual circumstances when the initialization pre-
scriptions of the COIN theorems do not result in optimal
global performance, the run-time updating component of the
framework can rectify the situation, so that optimal perfor-
mance is achieved.
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